期刊文献+

气候政策的微分博弈及其环境效应分析 被引量:8

Analysis of the Differential Game of Climate Policy and its Environmental Effect
原文传递
导出
摘要 文章基于微分博弈原理,构建了全球福利最大化下的两国微分博弈模型,分析了碳税、碳关税、碳减排合作三种气候政策对全球福利和全球碳排放的影响。运用Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman方程分别求得了静态线性Markov完美纳什均衡的最优碳税和碳关税水平。研究发现,在给定的碳排放水平下,全球福利在单边碳税政策下最小,碳关税次之,碳减排合作政策下最大;但碳排放存量则以单边碳税政策的最大,碳关税政策的次之,碳减排合作政策的最小;就全球碳减排效应而言,碳减排合作政策是最优的,碳关税政策次之,单边碳税政策最差。这主要是由于单边碳税存在"碳泄漏"现象和"免费搭车效应",使执行相对宽松环境标准的国家从中受益,同时严格的气候政策将有利于气候宽松政策国家的企业国际竞争力的提高,即存在"租金转移效应"。碳关税和碳减排合作政策则可以部分或完全消除这些效应的影响。 Based on the theory of differential game, the paper constructs the differential game model of two countries in the condition of global warfare maximization, analyzes the effect of carbon tax, carbon tariff and carbon emission cooperation policy on global warfare, and gets the optimal carbon tax rate and carbon tariff rate in a stationary Markov perfect Nash equilibrium by using Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. The results show that given the same level of carbon emissions, global welfare is the least with the one-side policy of carbon tax, more with the policy of carbon tariff and the most with the policy of carbon emission cooperation. But when it comes to the stock of carbon emissions, the largest amount lies with the one-side policy of carbon tax, the next largest with the policy of carbon tariff and the least with the policy of carbon emission cooperation. Besides, in terms of effects of global carbon emissions, the biggest one is the policy of carbon emission cooperation, the second biggest one is the policy of carbon tariff and the least one is the one-side policy of carbon tax. This is because in the presence of carbon tax, there exist "carbon leakage" and "free-riding effect", which benefits the foreign country with a looser environmental policy, and at the same time, a tougher climate policy in the home country enhances the competitiveness of the foreign firm as a result of an increase in the home firm's pollution abatement costs, which is called "rent-shifting effect". In addition, carbon tariff policy and carbon emission corporation policy can partially or completely eliminate these effects.
出处 《国际经贸探索》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第5期39-51,共13页 International Economics and Trade Research
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71273114)
关键词 气候政策 微分博弈 环境效应 碳税 碳关税 碳减排合作 climate policy differential game environmental effect carbon tax carbontariff carbon emission cooperation
  • 相关文献

参考文献19

二级参考文献69

  • 1贺小勇.论世贸组织体制下的环境边境税调整[J].国际商务(对外经济贸易大学学报),1997(5):50-53. 被引量:7
  • 2赵来军,李怀祖.流域跨界水污染纠纷税收调控管理模型研究[J].中国管理科学,2004,12(5):144-148. 被引量:13
  • 3赵来军,李旭,朱道立,李怀祖.流域跨界污染纠纷排污权交易调控模型研究[J].系统工程学报,2005,20(4):398-403. 被引量:29
  • 4Goh, Gavin. The World Trade Organization, Kyoto and Energy Tax Adjustments at the Border [ J ]. Journal of World Trade, 2004, 38 (3) :395 -423. 被引量:1
  • 5Mander T, Veenendaal P. Border Tax Adjustments and the EU-ETS- A Quantitative Assessment[ R]. CPB Document, 2009, ( 171 ) :36. 被引量:1
  • 6Stigliz J E. Making Globalization Work [ M ]. New York : W W Norton & Company,2006. 被引量:1
  • 7Biermann, Brohm R. Implementing the Kyoto Protocol without the USA: the Strategic Role of Energy Tax Adjustments at the border [J], Climate Policy, 2005,4(3), 289-302. 被引量:1
  • 8Ismer R. and Neuhoff K. Border Tax Adjustment : A Feasible Way to Support Stringent Emission Trading[ R]. CMI Working Paper, 2007, NO. 36. 被引量:1
  • 9Bordoff J. E. The Threat to Free Trade Posed by Climate Change Policy[ R]. Remarks to the Geneva Trade and Development Forum, 2008, September 19, Crans-Montana,Switzerland. 被引量:1
  • 10World Bank. International Trade and Climate Change: Economic, Legal, and Institutional Perspectives [ R ]. Washington D. C., World Bank, 2007. 被引量:1

共引文献70

同被引文献203

引证文献8

二级引证文献92

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部