摘要
并购信息的违规披露是企业并购过程中存在的严重问题。目前,我国政府监管机构对违规披露并购信息的企业普遍惩罚较轻,导致在解决这一问题时有局限性。通过建立非对称信息条件下的企业并购信息监管基本博弈模型,分析政府管制成本、企业违规披露的惩罚及企业违规披露时获得的溢出收益三因素对政府监管的影响,得出提高对企业惩罚可以从根源上减少此种违法事件的结论,此结论通过广发证券借壳上市案得到验证。
Illegal information disclosure is a serious problem in the process of company＇s M＆A. At present, there is a limitation to solve this problem as a result of that the government regulatory agencies always impose a slight and superficial punishment upon the violators. In this paper, a gambling model for the information monitory in company＇s M＆A is established under the condition of information asymmetry to analyze three factors that could affect the government agencies＇ behaviors. Such factors include the government regulation cost, the punishment and the spillover benefits of the violators＇. The model manifests that the intensification of punishment on the corporation＇s irregular and illegal disclosure can minimize such cases from the root, which has been verified by GF Securities backdoor listing case as well.
出处
《北京交通大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
2013年第1期23-27,共5页
Journal of Beijing Jiaotong University(Social Sciences Edition)
关键词
并购
非对称信息
监管
博弈
mergers ＆ acquisitions
information asymmetry
regulation
game
