摘要
采用2002-2009年中国制造业上市公司数据,本文检验了供应商集中度和客户集中度对公司审计师聘用决策的影响。研究结果显示,对于非国有公司来说,供应商集中度或客户集中度越高,公司聘用大所进行审计的概率越低。对于国有公司来说,随着供应商集中度或客户集中度的上升,公司聘用大所进行审计的概率先逐渐下降,但随后又逐渐上升,呈现出U型关系;但是,这种U型关系只在国有股比例较高的公司中存在。本文的研究结果表明,公司会通过聘用高质量的审计师向供应商或客户发送信号,换言之,审计信号理论对于投资者之外的利益相关者也是适用的。
We investigate the impact of supplier concentration and customer concentration on auditor choice of SOEs and non-SOEs by using the data of Chinese listed manufacturing firms from 2002 to 2009. The results show that the higher the supplier concentration or customer concentration, the lower the probability for non-SOEs to hire large audit firms. As the supplier concentration or customer concentration increases, the probability for SOEs to hire large audit firms decrease at first, but then increase gradually, showing a U-shaped relationship. However, this U-shaped relationship only exists in SOEs with higher proportion of state-owned shares. Our study shows that firms tend to hire high quality auditors to send signals to suppliers and customers, which implies that audit signaling theory is also applicable for stakeholders in addition to investors.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第12期81-86,95,共6页
Accounting Research
基金
中国人民大学科学研究基金(中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助)(批准号:11XNJ006)项目成果
