摘要
本文以红利上缴为背景，研究国有企业经理人的激励问题。将红利上缴后留存的利润视为对国有企业经理人的一种激励，通过构建只具有生产任务和同时具有生产、在职消费双重任务的委托代理模型，研究红利上缴与国有企业经理人激励之间的权衡。模型研究表明．激励强度与能力系数正相关，与风险规避程度、外部环境不确定性、成本系数负相关．在职消费与生产性努力此消彼长，这为红利上缴政策设计提供了依据。基于上市公司的计量分析发现：提高分红比例确实会损害企业经营绩效，因此在提高红利上缴比例时．应加快完善国有企业经理人激励制度，加强对在职消费等不良行为的监管力度。
Based on the background of dividend payout, this paper studies the incentives of the managers of SOE. Considering the retained profits after dividend payout as an incentive for managers of SOE, the paper studies the trade-off between the dividend and the incentive to the managers of SOE, by constructing principal-agent theory models of production-only task and production added on-duty consumption dual task. The model studies have shown that the incentive strength is positively correlated with ability coefficient, while negatively correlated with the degree of risk aversion, the uncertainty of the external environment and the cost coefficient, and that on- duty consumption and productive effort are counter-balance, which provides the basis for the policy design of dividend payout. Based on the listed company＇s econometric analysis found that, raising the dividend ratio indeed can damage the enterprises＇ operating performance, so during increasing the ratio, we should accelerate the improvement of SOE managers＇ incentive system and strengthen the supervision of the on-duty consumption and other undesirable behaviors. Structural cutoff point test also shows that the dividend ratio of SOE still has a considerable space for increasing.
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第1期116-127,共12页
China Industrial Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目“污染减排对产业结构调整的倒逼传导机制及政策研究”(批准号11AZD029)
中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目“宏观调控背景下所有制结构变动研究”(批准号DUT13RW301)
关键词
国有企业
红利上缴
委托代理
激励强度
state-owned enterprise
dividend
principal-agent
incentive intensity
