期刊文献+

公共选择理论框架下投票出席行为论述 被引量:4

Behavior of Voting Turnout under the Frame of Public Choice Theory
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摘要 本质上,投票是揭示个体偏好并进而加总成社会偏好的一种手段。从个体投票出席行为入手,可以有效地揭示个体在参与公共事务治理过程中的个体偏好以及事实存在的利益冲突。作为政策制定者,可以根据投票人的出席行为,通过设计具体的投票机制有效地调和上述矛盾。而最优投票机制设计与应用有赖于对投票出席行为的把握,在此基础上可以发现个体在公共事务中的利益冲突,进而为选择具有针对性的矛盾解决方案提供依据。鉴于此,本文重点从个体出席投票动机、个体偏好与出席动机之间的关系以及影响其出席行为的诸多因素这三方面展开论述。 Essentially, voting is a method of revealing individual preference and then to aggregate to social preference. Begining with the voting turnout behavior, individual preference and the exiting contradiction can be uncovered effectively, and then a suitable voting mechanism can be drawn to modify such contradiction. Understanding the voting behavior is the key element of design and implication of best vote mechanism. Based on those, the contradiction among public issues can be found and solution aiming for such contradiction can be selected. Therefore, an intensive review is presented here focusing on the motivation of voting turnout, how the preference is revealed by individual strategic turnout behav- ior and what kind of factors are on voting turnout.
作者 宗计川
出处 《中国行政管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第1期117-120,共4页 Chinese Public Administration
基金 国家自然科学基金青年项目(项目编号:71102088) 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(项目编号:09YJC790032)的阶段性成果
关键词 公共选择 投票出席行为 投票悖论 Public Choice, Behavior of Voting Turnout, Voting Paradox
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参考文献17

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二级参考文献17

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