摘要
以博弈论为研究方法,分析由一个制造商和两个零售商构成的二级逆向供应链,在再制品市场需求信息不对称条件下,基于政府不参与逆向供应链运作、政府分别对制造商和零售商废旧品回收进行奖励的三种情形,建立决策模型。研究结果表明:政府参与能使回收量和整个逆向供应链系统的期望利润增加;政府对零售商实施奖励措施时回收效果更加明显。
Based on game theory, this paper analyzes the reverse supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two retailers, under the conditions of the re - products market demand information asymmetry, it builds decision - making modal in three dif- ferent models of when the government do not participate in the reverse supply chain, when the government implements award policy to retailers and when the government implements award policy to manufactures. The result shows that the government participation can increase the amount of the recycled products and can increase the expectations profit of the whole reverse sup- ply chain. And it also finds that the effect is more obvious when tile government implements award policy to retailers.
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第12期36-40,共5页
Soft Science
基金
国家社会科学基金青年项目(10CGL025)
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(10YJA630043)
江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学基金项目(2011SJB630007)
江苏大学高级专业人才科研启动基金项目(11JDG005)
