摘要
假设市场中有两家具有研发能力和模仿能力的竞争者,先成功申请专利方称为领导者(leader),对方称为跟随者(follower)。基于专利生命周期,通过比较不同策略组合下领导者和跟随者的均衡收益,研究了跟随者进行研发投资或者模仿的边界条件以及在跟随者不同策略下领导者的专利许可边界。研究结果表明:当研发效率和研发投资系数或者模仿成本满足一定条件时,进行研发投资或者模仿是跟随者的占优策略;领导者会扩大其许可边界以阻止跟随者的研发和模仿行为。
Hypothesized that two competitors that are capable to R＆D and imitate producing a homogene- ous production, the one that applied for the patent firstly is the leader and the other one is the follower. Based on the life-cycle of the patent, the equilibrium profits for the leader and the follower were compared with different strategies, and the boundaries of investment or imitation and patent licensing were analyzed. Results of research indicate that RInD or imitation is follower＇s dominant strategy under R＆D efficiency and R＆D investment parameter or imitation costs satisfies certain conditions; the leader will expand its li- censing boundary to prevent R＆D and imitation.
出处
《青岛大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
2012年第4期74-77,共4页
Journal of Qingdao University(Natural Science Edition)
关键词
研发投资
模仿
固定费用许可
R＆D investment
Imitation
Fixed-fee licensing
