摘要
本文通过构建上市公司2003-2007年的面板数据,实证检验融资性负债能否约束企业的过度投资行为以及金融发展能否影响企业融投资关系。研究结果表明,整体上融资性负债和上市公司的过度投资呈显著负相关,但这种负相关关系主要是由非国有控股上市公司所带来,对于国有控股上市公司,融资性负债反而带来了更加严重的代理问题;在其他条件相同的情况下,金融发展水平越高,融资性负债对上市公司过度投资的约束作用越明显,金融发展水平的这种影响,在国有控股上市公司中更为明显。此外,本项研究还发现,不同期限的负债对上市公司过度投资行为的影响程度不尽相同。
With the sample data of China＇ s listed companies from 2003 to 2007, this paper investigates financing debts Whether constraint over - investment behavior of businesses and financial development Whether can affect the relationship between corporate financing and investment. The empirical results show that the relation between financing liabilities and over - investment in listed companies was negative, but this negative correlation is mainly caused byon - state - controlled listed companies. Financing liabilities have more serious agency problems in State Holding Listed Companies; Other things being equal, The higher level of financial development, Financing liabilities to control excessive investment in listed companies is more powerful, and this effect of financial debelopment is more obvious in state - controlled listed companies. In addition, the study also found that effect of different duration of liabilities overinvestment behavior is different.
出处
《南方经济》
CSSCI
2012年第11期67-79,共13页
South China Journal of Economics
基金
广东省哲学社会科学规划一般项目(09E03)
电子科技大学中山学院科研启动基金项目(410YKQ06)的资助
关键词
金融发展
最终控制人性质
融资性负债
过度投资
Financial Development
Debt Governance
Ownership Nature of the Ultimatecontroller
Overinvestment
