摘要
在过去30年中,卫生服务费用的快速增长已成为一个全球性问题。针对此问题,我国采取了以改革支付方式为主要内容的医院筹资改革。虽然每个医院都设计与实施了各自的奖金支付方式,以达到各自的目标,但有可能偏离或背离了政府的改革目的。从理论上讲,奖金制度应有助于医院提高生产效率,增强经济活力,改善社会效率。但在实际运作中,奖金制度一方面可激励医生提高生产率,提供更多的必要服务;另一方面又可能激励医生诱导病人需求,提供不必要服务。前一种情况可以达到改革的预期目的,而后一种情况显然没有达到预期目的。带着这些问题与思考,我们进行了医生支付方式改革对医院服务效率的影响研究。
The rapid increase of health care expenditure has become a global problem in the past 30 years. A hospital financing reform has accordingly started in China, focusing on the reform of the payment system. Although every hospital has designed and implemented its own bonus payment system so as to achieve their respective aim, their practice may have deviated or divorced from the governments refrom initiatives. Theoretically, the bonus payment system should help promote productivity, reinforce financial sustainability and improve social efficiency of hospital services. In practice, however, while the system provides incentives for doctors to promote productivity by providing more necessary services, it may also encourage doctors to induce patients needs and provide more unnecessary care. It is obvious that the former is expected and the latter is not. Based on the above considerations, a study on the impact of reform in payment to doctors on the efficiency of hospital services has been undertaken.
出处
《中华医院管理杂志》
北大核心
2000年第3期144-146,共3页
Chinese Journal of Hospital Administration
