摘要
我国成品油定价实行最高零售限价已三年有余,价格管制在平抑国际油价冲击的同时也产生许多问题,管制效果备受争议,政府的补贴政策也饱受诟病。基于成品油最高零售限价,石油双寡头、寡头与政府之间的博弈行为表明:最高零售限价不能解决高油价问题,对形成成品油市场的竞争格局作用不大,而且政府在与石油寡头的博弈中处于弱势地位,针对国有石油企业的补贴政策将造成财政资金的浪费。我国成品油定价改革方向为市场定价,根本问题是尚未形成垄断竞争的市场格局。成品油定价改革应在培育垄断竞争格局的基础上,改革燃油税为从价计征、完善石油储备体系,为市场化定价改革铺平道路。
The petroleum retail prices have been ceiling price in more than three years.The regulation policy not only restrains the shock of international fluctuations in oil prices,but also causes many problems.The regulation effects are controversial and the government subsidies are also much-maligned.On the premise of petroleum ceiling price,the game behavior between duopoly oligarchs and between these two and the government shows that： the petroleum ceiling price can’t solve the problem of high prices,and it plays little role in the formation of petroleum market competition pattern.Also,the government is disadvantaged in the game,so the government subsidies may lead to the waste of finance funds.The reform direction of petroleum pricing mechanism is market-oriented pricing,the fundamental problem of which is that the market pattern of monopolistic competition has not formed.The petroleum pricing reformation should focus on cultivating the monopolistic competition pattern,levying fuel tax by means of ad valorem and perfecting the petroleum reserve system so as to make preparations for market-oriented pricing.
出处
《经济与管理》
CSSCI
2012年第10期82-87,共6页
Economy and Management
基金
上海市教委重点学科建设项目(J50504)
关键词
成品油
定价机制
寡头垄断
博弈
Petroleum products
Pricing mechanism
Oligopoly
Game
