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评级功能视角下的利益冲突和付费模式 被引量:16

Interest Conflicts and Pay Model of Credit Rating Industry
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摘要 信用评级作为风险评估机制和信息披露的手段,功能在于保护投资者利益和提高资本市场效率。金融危机充分暴露了发行人付费模式下的利益冲突给信用评级行业带来的发展困境。探索多种形式的付费模式,有效平衡和协调信用评级机构盈利性质与其享有公共管理职权之间的矛盾将是评级监管改革主要内容。探讨当前评级监管和评级收费模式改革趋势,有助于为处于初始发展阶段的中国评级行业提供有益的启示。 Credit rating, as a risk assessment mechanism and information disclosure means, is used to protect the interests of investors and to improve the efficiency of capital markets. Financial crisis show conflicts of interest existing in issuer-payment mode may raise dilemma to credit rating industry. Regulatory reform of rating industry are currently focusing on strengthening regulatory system, and improving rating transparency, how to achieve balance for-profit and its public management functions will be the future focus. Rethinking its reform, as well as its malfunction in the crisis, should bring enlightenments to china's development of rating industry.
作者 黄国平
出处 《证券市场导报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第10期67-72,共6页 Securities Market Herald
关键词 信用评级机构 利益冲突 收入模式 评级购买 信用评级 credit rating agency, conflicts of interest, pay model, rating shopping, redit rating
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参考文献11

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二级参考文献15

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引证文献16

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