摘要
根据巴塞尔委员会的要求,国内主要商业银行将逐步实施巴塞尔新资本协议,而部分中小商业银行距离巴塞尔协议的要求仍较远。这种资本监管"双轨制"将影响银行生态系统的演进,形成新的中小企业信贷市场格局。本文通过建立商业银行风险偏好模型和模仿者动态模型,将银行业视为有限理性的金融生态系统,开展进化博弈分析和实证检验。结果表明,当高风险资产的预期收益率高于低风险资产时,资本监管将降低商业银行风险偏好,考虑到大银行和中小银行风险期望和风险管控能力的差距以及中小企业融资满足率现状,最终将形成大银行专注大企业贷款、中小银行专注中小企业贷款的市场结构。
Under the requirement from the Basel Committee, the main commercial bank will implement the New Basel Agreement, while the small and medium sized commercial banks are far away. This kind of ＇ Double track system＇ of capital regulation will influence the evolutionary of bank ecological system, forming new SME credit market struc- ture. This paper treats the banking as limited rationality finance ecological system and operates evolutionary game and empirical analysis. The results show that operation of the capital regulation can reduce the risk preference, as the ex- pected return of high risk asset exceeded that of low risk asset. Taking into account of risk management ability and fi- nancing satisfaction rate, it will be forming a market structure as big banks supplying large enterprise credit, while small and medium sized banks supplying SME credit.
出处
《区域金融研究》
2012年第9期9-15,共7页
Journal of Regional Financial Research
关键词
资本监管
中小企业
生态系统
进化博弈
Capital Regulation
SME
Ecological System
Evolutionary Game
