摘要
以2007-2008年非金融类上市公司为样本,研究了债权治理与盈余质量之间的关系,得到以下研究结论:资产负债率与盈余质量显著负相关,短期资产负债率与盈余质量显著负相关,长期资产负债率与盈余质量呈现出不显著的正相关关系。进一步研究后发现,短期债务融资是引发盈余质量恶化的主要原因,而长期债务融资虽然一定程度上改善了上市公司的盈余质量,但这种效果总的来说并不显著。此外,最终控制人的国有性质加剧了债务契约引发的盈余管理动机,恶化了盈余质量。
Using non-financial companies listed in 2007-2008 as sample, this paper studies the relationship between debt financing and earnings quality from the perspective of governance of creditor＇s right and gets the following basic conclusions： there is significant negative correlation between the ratio of liabilities to assets and earnings quality, and significant negative correlation between the ratio of short-term liabilities to assets and earnings quality. There is positive correlation between the ratio of long-term liabilities to assets and earnings quality, but not to the extent of statistical significance. Further researches show that short-term debt financing is the main reason for the deterioration of earnings quality, although long-term debt financing to some extent improves the earnings quality of listed companies, but this effect is not significant in general. In addition, the nature of. the debtor＇s state-owned enterprise weakens the rigid constraints of debt covenants and intensifies the motivation to manipulate earnings.
出处
《管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第9期75-82,共8页
Management Review
关键词
债权治理
盈余质量
债务融资
经验证据
governance of creditor＇ s rights, earnings quality, debt financing, empirical evidence
