摘要
文章研究的是腐败路径的选择及其变化的内生微观机制。在完全信息、制度环境不变、社会成员同质条件下,存在两个稳定的腐败均衡;当社会成员非集体理性行为不受约束时,腐败将成为行为人占优策略,全社会也会因之陷入高腐败均衡"陷阱"。在模型引入社会资本因素后,我们发现,在制度环境不变的条件下,信息不完全、社会成员的异质性、相互信任程度和腐败环境,是可能引起腐败路径转变的关键因素。上述理论分析得到了微观经验数据逻辑回归结果的支持。
This article studies corruption paths and the micro mechanism of their transition from the perspective of social capital. In a given environment, corruption becomes the dominant strategy for individual decision makers and the society becomes entrapped in high- corruption equilibrium when irrationality in collective behavior is not constrained by mutual trust. Taking social capital into consideration, we find that, in the long run, the level of mutual trust is the crucial factor in determining whether the society will take the path of low corruption or high corruption. However, in the short run, the level of moral heterogeneity between individuals, government supervision and reprisals, and information transparency are the prominent factors that change the existing corruption path at any given time. The theories proposed are tested with micro data and supported by logistic regression results.
出处
《经济社会体制比较》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第5期145-158,共14页
Comparative Economic & Social Systems
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"基于案例库支持的腐败与经济发展相关性研究"(项目编号:71073060)
教育部人文社科基金项目"高校艺术类招生考试中的腐败预防策略研究"(项目编号:09JDJYLZ04)
关键词
行为环境
社会资本
腐败均衡
演化机制
Behavioral Environment
Social Capital
Corruption Equilibrium
Evolution Mechanism
