摘要
国企高管作为投资决策的核心人员，在投资决策过程中存在非理性的现象。论文从过度自信理论对国企高管过度投资行为的动因进行了分析，并在此基础上从个人层面和公司层面提出了国企高管人员过度投资行为控制机制，包括区分决策和行动、构建自我学习机制、董事会内部治理和心理契约的使用等。
As core staff of the investment decision-making, executives of the state-owned enterprises may be non-rationality in the investment decision-making process. The paper analyze the motivation of the over-investment behavior of state-owned enterprises executives based on theory of overconfidence, and the over-investment behavioral control mechanisms including distinction between decisions and actions, building self-learning mechanism, the internal governance of the Board, and use of the psychological contract from personal level and corporate level are analyzed.
出处
《时代经贸》
2012年第16期105-107,共3页
TIMES OF ECONOMY & TRADE
关键词
国企高管
过度投资
控制机制
过度自信
state-owned enterprises executives
over-investment
control mechanism
overconfidence
