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“主制造商-供应商”协同主体双重努力最优合作协调 被引量:14

The Optimal Cooperation and Coordination Eechanisms of “Main Manufacturer-supplier” Collaborative Bodies through Double Efforts
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摘要 "主制造商-供应商"模式越来越多地被飞机等复杂产品的研制生产采用,主制造商和供应商关系由竞争转为合作。基于供应商个体努力程度和合作程度构建了双重努力供应链协调模型,研究了主制造商非协调控制下纳什均衡和协调控制下的合作均衡问题,找出各情形下供应商的最优努力水平和合作程度,把非协调控制收益作为威慑点,建立了主制造商协调控制的利益分配规划模型,找出最优利益分配比例。研究结果表明,主制造商控制利益最优分配比例的同时可实现供应链整体利益最大化及供应商利益不受损的协调目的,并诱导供应商确定协调下的努力水平和合作程度,实现整个供应链的有效协调。 At present, with the increasing use of the " main manufacturer-supplier" model in the development and manufacturing of complex products, such as aircraft and so on, the main manufacturer and supplier relationship transforms from competition to cooperation. The supply chain coordination model of double efforts is built based on the level of individual supplier's effort and cooperation, which addresses Nash equilibrium of main manufacturers under non-coordinated control and cooperative equilibrium under coordinated control. Furthermore, the distribution planning model of coordinated control of the main manufacturers is built based on the benefits of non-coordinated control, in which the benefit of non-coordinated control is considered as a deterrence point, to find the optimal level of the suppliers' effort and cooperation, and the optimal benefit allocation ratio. The results show that the main manufacturers can achieve maximum benefits of the whole supply chain and realize the co-ordination purposes of not damaging the interests of suppliers, while controlling the optimal benefit allocation ratio, and induce the suppliers to determine the level of efforts and degree of cooperation under the coordination, to achieve effective coordination of the entire supply chain.
出处 《系统工程》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2012年第7期30-34,共5页 Systems Engineering
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71002046 70971064) 中国博士后基金资助项目(20100481135) 省博士后基金资助项目(1001051C) 省社会科学联合会项目(11SC-044) 南京航空航天大学基础科学研究专项(NJ20120011)
关键词 “主制造商-供应商”模式 双重努力 利益协调 最优分配比例 "Main Manufacturer-supplier" Mode Double Efforts Interest Coordination Optimal Allocation Ratio
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