摘要
上市公司的债权人治理,实质上是债权人利益保护行为导向下的债务契约外部性实现过程。上市公司政治关联程度在债权人治理过程中起到重要的调节作用。本文选取政治关系资源依赖性较强的民营上市公司面板数据作为研究样本,通过构建政治关联指数,分析政治关联对债权人治理与代理成本关系的调节效应。研究结果显示,民营上市公司流动负债对代理成本具有显著抑制作用,而长期负债却对代理成本表现出促进效应;民营上市公司政治关联程度恶化了债权人治理效应,其对流动负债的治理效应具有负向调节作用,而对长期负债的刺激效应表现出正向调节作用。
The essence of creditors＇ governance towards listed private corporations is the exter- nality of debt contract between creditors and corporations. Political connection （PC）, a crucial reg- ulated variable, has been playing a significant part during the performance of creditors＇ governance. Having selected listed private corporations as our research sample, which contains high dependence upon government, this paper has analyzed regulation effect of political connections between credi- tors＇ governance and agency cost through setting up PC index system. The results have showed that current liabilities can restrain the increase of agency cost in private corporations, while fixed li abilities can boost agency cost. Political connections have worsened creditors＇ governance effect. PC regulates governance effect of current liabilities in a negative way, while regulates governance of fixed liabilities in a positive way.
出处
《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第7期105-114,共10页
Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
基金
教育部人文社科青年基金资助项目(11YJC630150)
关键词
政治关联
债权人治理
代理成本
外部性
political connection
creditors
governance
agency cost
externality
