摘要
伯林的价值多元论主张价值是多元的、不可通约的和冲突的。由于价值多元论与相对主义都拒绝绝对价值和绝对标准,因而一些学者质疑价值多元论是相对主义的。伯林站在价值一元论与相对主义的中道立场,通过求助于共同人性与普遍价值作了回应,不过这种论证依然没有逃脱自由主义的普遍主义模式。
Berlin＇s value-pluralism is held that values are plural, incommensurable and conflict. As both value-pluralism and relativism reject absolute values and measures, some scholars doubted value-pluralism was relativism. Being at the middle position of value monism and relativism, Berlin retorted though appealing to common human nature and universal values. While his argument still doesn＇t escape the universal method of Liberalism.
出处
《天津师范大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第4期7-12,22,共7页
Journal of Tianjin Normal University(Social Science)
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(10BZZ002)
