摘要
笔者研究了集群供应链跨链合作与政府监管的博弈模型,通过在不同单链式供应链在不同策略下各自的成本和收益基础上,运用博弈理论研究了政府环境管制与集群供应链跨链合作的关系。研究结果表明:原材料的采购价格和单位副产品的排污收费是集群供应链实施跨链合作的驱动力;再利用固定成本以及废弃物的产出规模是集群供应链跨链合作能否实施的先决条件;政府的法制监管成本、环境管制失职招致的信誉损失、政府对核心企业副产品排放而进行的罚款直接影响到博弈结果。
Based on the analysis of costs and benefits of cluster supply chain, this paper studies the relation between on environmental regulation and crosswise cooperation of cluster supply chain by game model. It is shown that material price and the fine of one unit by-product emissions are the driving power of cluster supply chain crosswise cooperation. The cost of reusing and the production scale of the wastes are the key factors for the realization of cluster supply chain crosswise cooperation. The legal regulatory costs of the govern-ment, the neglect of government regulation duty incurred the credibility losses, and the government fine of by-product emissions of the core enterprise directly affect the game result.
出处
《经济经纬》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第4期81-84,共4页
Economic Survey
基金
教育部人文社科基金资助项目(08JA630063)
湖北省教育厅重大项目(Z20081702)
中国物流学会研究课题(2012CSLKT142)
关键词
集群供应链
跨链合作
政府监管
博弈分析
Cluster Supply Chain
Crosswise Cooperation
Environmental Regulation
Game Analysis
