摘要
文章旨在考察中国政府绩效考核对县乡领导干部行为产生的影响。在介绍中国农村地区地方政府考核体系的基础上,文章依据作者的实地调研和所收集的文献资料重点分析了地方干部对考核的行为反应。文章发现,尽管不同的干部群体之间存在很大的差异,但绩效考核体系和考核目标显然已经成为影响地方干部行为的一个重要指挥棒。最后,文章为研究中国农村地区的政府绩效考核提供了一种新的视角:一方面,考核对地方干部行为起到了引导作用,建立了一种激励机制,并由此成为政治沟通的特殊渠道;另一方面,考核激发了地方领导干部的社会反应,尤其是激发了他们的群体性动力,而群体性动力对激励机制的影响也许要大于考核本身所体现的激励作用。
This study investigates the impact of political evaluations on the behaviour of leading county and township cadres in rural China. After introducing the institutional foundations of the evaluation system for local administrations in rural China,the article features the behavioural responses of local cadres to evaluations as iden- tified in our interviews and secondary literature. Although there are important variations among different groups of officials, it becomes obvious that the performance evaluation system and its targets have become an important point of orientation for local cadres. Finally, in the conclusion of this article the argument for an alternative per- spective on performance evaluations in the context of rural China will be developed： on the one side a channel for specialised political communication, steering cadres＇ behaviour and promoting an incentive system, on the other side a trigger to a multitude of social responses of leading local cadres, i. e. to generate group dynamics that, in the end, might have more influence on incentives than the incentives embodied in the evaluations them- selves.
出处
《经济社会体制比较》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第3期95-112,共18页
Comparative Economic & Social Systems
基金
"社会主义新农村建设:作为战略性群体的县乡干部"受到德国研究基金会的资助
关键词
绩效考核
地方干部行为
群体性动力
地方发展
Performance Evaluation
Local Cadres＇ Behaviour
Group Dynamics
Local Development
