摘要
金融监管治理是公共治理在金融监管领域的具体表现。基于风险规避代理人与风险中性委托人的特征,对监管者的激励机制设计问题进行的研究发现,在完全信息条件下,代理人的基本收益等于参与收入与努力成本之和;在不完全信息条件下,代理人的收益与风险规避系数等相关,而委托人的期望收益则出现下降。因此,在不完全信息条件下,必须通过相应的激励方案来促使代理人能够付出完全的努力,并将问责惩罚机制纳入到当前的金融监管绩效考核中。
Abstract： Governance of financial supervision instantiates public governance in the sphere of financial supervision. Taking into account the characteristics of the risk aversion agent and the risk neutral principal, this paper studies the ques- tions designed by the government departments for the incentive mechanism of financial supervisors and shows that under the condition of complete information the agent＇ s basic benefit equals the sum of retained earnings and the cost of effort, and that under the condition of incomplete information the agent＇ s basic benefit is related with risk aversion coefficient, but the principal＇ s expected portfolio yields decrease. It is therefore argued that, under the condition of incomplete information, incentive programs are needed to encourage agents to make every effort and that the mechanism of punishment for failure in accountability should be introduced into the current financial supervision and performance appraisal.
出处
《厦门大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第3期50-56,共7页
Journal of Xiamen University(A Bimonthly for Studies in Arts & Social Sciences)
关键词
金融监管治理
委托代理
激励机制
governance of supervision, principal and agent, incentive mechanism
