摘要
笔者以沪深交易所2006年～2008年所有实施股权激励的A股上市公司数据为样本,实证研究了股权激励与盈余管理之间的关系,研究发现股权激励数量与盈余管理程度显著正相关,行权限制期与盈余管理程度显著负相关。国有上市公司股权激励的盈余管理效应比非国有上市公司明显,市场化程度高的地区上市公司股权激励的盈余管理效应较之于市场化程度低的地区要弱一些。此外,高质量的外部审计可以有效地抑制企业的盈余管理程度。
An empirical study is made on the relationship between stock options and earning management by processing the data of listed companies at Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2006 to 2008.It shows that the number of stock options and the degree of earnings management are positively related wheras the exercise restriction period is negatively correlated with the degree of earnings management.Meanwhile,the effect of earnings management after stock options in the state-owned companies is more significant than that of non-stated-owned companies;the effect of earnings management after stock options in the high degree marketization areas is weaker than the low degree marketization areas.In addition,high quality external audit effectively reduces the extent of earnings management.
出处
《经济经纬》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第3期90-94,共5页
Economic Survey
基金
教育部人文社科基金项目(09YJC790141)
南京财经大学2011年研究生创新研究项目(M11067)
关键词
股权激励
制度环境
盈余管理
Stock Options
Institutional Environment
Earnings Management
