摘要
本文研究具有两个不同消费级别的两家酒店在完全信息条件下收益管理的单期静态博弈。讨论了酒店分别在竞争与合作两种情况下,对于低价房间预留数目的设定策略。在竞争情况下,证明了纳什均衡唯一解的存在性。在合作情况下,分析了两酒店的节省成本及目标函数的凹性。在合作情况下,提出了使两酒店总收益大幅度提高的条件。最后,用一些算例(假设客房预定需求变量服从截断正态分布)分析了在每种情况下的酒店最优管理方案。
This paper studies a two-player two-fare-class static single-period hotel revenue management game with complete information. Booking limit policies are investigated in both non-coopeative and coop- erative situations. We show the existence of unique Nash equilibrium in the non-cooperative situation. In the cooperative game, we analyze the cost saving of the two players （i. e. , hotels） and investigate the concavity of the objective function. For both non-cooperative and cooperative settings, we assume the booking requests to be a truncated normal distribution when the players adopt different strategies. For the cooperative setting we identify conditions which give rise to substantial improvements in the total system revenue. Finally, under each game theoretic setting, we present the managerial implications of our solu- tions along with numerical examples.
出处
《国际商务研究》
北大核心
2012年第3期69-80,共12页
International Business Research
关键词
酒店收益管理
博弈论
纳什均衡
合作博弈
hotel revenue management
game theory
Nash equilibrium
cooperative game
