期刊文献+

认证协议漏洞自动检测系统设计与实现 被引量:1

Design and Implementation of Automatic Detection System for Authentication Protocol Loophole
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摘要 从攻击者的角度出发,总结系统攻击的2个特性,设计一个协议漏洞自动检测系统。通过目标查找算法、可利用资源查找算法及协议漏洞查找算法,找到多种攻击认证协议的途径,由此发现协议存在的漏洞。对Needham-Schroeder、Neuman-Stubblebine和Otway-Rees协议的测试结果表明,该系统可正确检测协议漏洞,模拟攻击方式。 From the attacker's point of view, this paper sums up two features of attack on system and designs an automatic detection system for authentication protocol loophole. By target lookup algorithm, available resource lookup algorithm and protocol vulnerabilities searching algorithm, it finds a variety of ways to attack the authentication protocol to discover loopholes in the protocol. Needham-Schroeder, NeumanStubblebine and Otway-Rees protocol are used to do tests, whose results show that the system can correctly detect the vulnerability of the protocol, and simulate the attack methods.
出处 《计算机工程》 CAS CSCD 2012年第9期134-137,共4页 Computer Engineering
基金 辽宁省自然科学基金资助项目"基于人体健康监测的无线传感网络辐射水平评估与优化"(201102067)
关键词 认证协议 漏洞查找 自动检测 可利用资源查找 目标查找 authentication protocol loophole lookup automatic detection available resource lookup object lookup
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参考文献7

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二级参考文献32

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