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基于连续时间动态博弈的供应链声誉及其微分对策研究 被引量:13

Supply Chain Reputation and its Differential Game Based on Dynamic Game in Continuous Time
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摘要 着眼于企业及其供应链的可持续发展,纳入时间因素分析供应链协调问题。基于供应链视角考虑顾客价值开拓,并将其本质抽象为"供应链声誉"的构建过程。针对这一供应链动态协调问题,基于供应链成员企业之间的长期合作关系,在连续时间背景下采用变分法建立了供应链各方关于供应链声誉的微分对策模型,通过求解该模型发现在拟约束方程组有解时Nash均衡存在,并求出了相应的最优微分对策。这些理论研究结论阐明了长期的、稳定的合作关系对于实现供应链协调的意义,对于实践中供应链动态协调的实现具有一定的启发与参考价值。论文最后对相关结论进行了数值分析。 The independence and interdependence in interests and policies between supply chain partners can lead to the gap between the expected utility of centralized and decentralized supply chain decision-making modes. Presently, it is a hot issue to coordinate supply chains on the basis of Newsvendor model. When addressing the single-period Newsvendor problem, people tend to focus on one- shot transaction --- or game ---relationship. However, in reality the cooperation between enterprises often appears to be long-term and dynamic even though the transaction of seasonal products is short-term. Supply chain partners in the long-term game share the same or even more important status. This kind of game can be found in combined prediction, combined investment, advertisement, reputation, etc.
出处 《管理工程学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第1期143-150,共8页 Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金 国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(70832005) 教育部博士点基金资助项目(20090072120062) 教育部人文社科资助项目(10YJC630382) 上海市自然科学基金资助项目(11ZR1438900) 上海市教委科研创新资助项目(09ZS39) 同济大学青年优秀人才资助项目(2009KJ057)
关键词 供应链声誉 长期合作 动态博弈 变分法 微分对策 supply chain reputation long-term cooperation dynamic game variational method differential game
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