摘要
本文关注高考志愿填报机制对优质大学学生质量的影响。我们首先论证由考前报改为考后报并引入平行志愿的改革模式可以带来事后的效率与公平("高分高就"),但未必增加事前的效率与公平("高能高就"或"高偏好高就")。基于某顶级学院的学生数据,利用各省历年志愿填报机制的变化,我们从实证上验证了这一假说:相对于考前无平行志愿的制度,该学院在考后填报制度下招收的学生高考成绩更高,但以大学学业衡量的学习能力或兴趣并没有更高。
Using a unique dataset from one of the top-ranked universities in China, we exam how the quality of matches between students and top schools is affected by alternative mechanisms, namely preference submission before or after exam and with or without parallel wills. The results show that, compared with other mechanisms, students admitted in the school under the mechanism of submission before exam without parallel wills have significantly lower exam scores but exhibit the same or even higher college academic performances. We believe that this reflects the students’ higher learning abilities or academic interests.
出处
《经济学（季刊）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第1期765-804,共40页
China Economic Quarterly
基金
国家自然科学基金管理科学部青年项目(项目批准号:70903042)的资助
国家自然科学基金项目"高考录取制度与匹配质量:基于择校机制理论的实证研究"(项目批准号:71173127)
"211工程"三期重点学科建设项目"数量经济学理论创新
模型系统研制与数据中心建设"的资助
