摘要
由于上市公司与股东之间交易合同的明确程度受限,公司信息生成与信息披露这一期间市场异常收益的产权没能得到明确界定,所以信息占优的上市公司管理层就会通过故意延迟信息披露攫取这部分产权未被界定的收益,这就是上市公司信息披露的内部性现象。本文以上市公司年报公告这一事件为例,通过理论模型推导和实证检验两种方法证实了其内部性的存在,以期对证券市场监管部门的信息披露监管选择和侧重提供参考。
Because the information disclosure contract can＇t be defined clearly both to companies and to stock holders, the ownership of abnormal revenue in the term between information born and information disclosed cannot be completely and clearly defined. So, taken the information advantages, corporation board of directors tries to grab the wealth. That is called internalities. In this article, with a case study of corporation annals publication, we attempt to prove the internalities in security market both by economic analysis and empirical test. The result may be useful to market supervisors.
出处
《金融发展研究》
2012年第2期17-22,共6页
Journal Of Financial Development Research
关键词
内部性
上市公司
年报
信息披露
internality, listed corporation, annals, information disclosure
