摘要
本文运用省级面板数据,研究财政分权对地方政府供给偏好的影响。研究发现,在财政激励和政治激励的双重作用下,地方政府的供给偏好整体上偏离于当地居民的公共服务需求偏好,并且这种扭曲型偏好具有显著的地区差异性,从而内生出区域之间公共服务供给水平的差距。为此,在保持适度财政分权的同时,应该变革地方政府的激励结构,重塑公共服务型政府。
Based on China＇s provincial - level panel data, the paper decentralization on local government＇s supplying preferences. The results influences of financial and political incentives, local government＇s supplying services demands of local resident, and this distorting preference has signifi studies the effects of financial indicate that under the double preferences deviate from public cant regional differences, which lead to the gap of public service supply between regions. Therefore, while maintaining an appropriate financial decentralization, the reform should change the incentive structure of local governments, reshape public service government.
出处
《重庆师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
2012年第1期102-111,共10页
Journal of Chongqing Normal University Edition of Social Siences
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"转型中的财政分权
地方政府竞争与区际基本公共服务差距:理论
实证与政策研究"(项目编号:10YJC790066)资助
关键词
财政分权
财政激励
政治激励
政府供给偏好
地区差异
financial decentralization
financial incentives
political incentives
local government＇ssupplying preferences
regional differences
