摘要
Fichte＇s various articulations of the Wissenschaftslehre （＂theory of scientific knowledge＂） are self-conscious attempts to systematize Kant＇s critical philosophy. Fichte＇s notion of the pure I （ieh） serves as the theoretical starting-point for his exposition of transcendental idealism, and in many ways this concept is analogous to Kant＇s notion of the transcendental unity of apperception explained in the Critique of Pure Reason. This paper argues that although Fichte and Kant agree on （1） the active nature of the pure I, （2） the distinction between pure and empirical apperception, and （3） skepticism concerning the possibility of theoretical knowledge of any positive （i.e., noumenal） content of the pure I, their respective notions of pure apperception differ in that Kant affirms the conceptual priority of the pure I to its objects while Fichte denies the same. Fichte＇s departure from Kant on this point foreshadows many later recognition theories of consciousness, e.g., those of Hegel and Marx.
