摘要
内生创新和外生合规是我国商业银行董事会构成的两类动力机制。经验分析显示,我国商业银行能够依据个体异质性因素合理选择董事会结构,内生创新机制初步显现。但是,外部监管对董事会职能产生了显著的替代效应,政府干预扭曲了银行董事会结构的自主选择,董事会治理的内生创新空间受到外生合规因素的抑制,导致了我国银行董事会规模大、独立性低的独特结构。进一步分析表明,董事会专门委员会的主动设立是对大董事会的有益补充,同时部分替代了独立董事的职能,成为董事会实现内生创新的现实路径。
Passive compliance and endogenous innovation are two main motivities for Chinese banks＇ board structure.This paper finds： After the previous stage governance reform,Chinese commercial banks board structure is endogenous structured determined by bank heterogeneous factors.While the regulatory nature and political interference distorts the optimal choice of board structure,thus compliance factors restrict the endogenous innovation structure of bank boards.Further analysis shows that,banks in China choose large size and less independent boards,subcommittees can offset the cost of big board and remedy the problems that arise with more insider dominated boards;it is a suboptimum choice under reality.
出处
《山西财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第2期37-45,共9页
Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金项目重大项目"经济全球化背景下中国产业安全研究"(10zd&029)
关键词
董事会结构
内生创新
外生合规
公司治理
board structure
passive compliance
endogenous innovation
corporate governance
