摘要
如何设计合理的金融契约以增强对创业企业家和风险投资者双方的激励是公司金融研究领域的一个重要话题。运用实验室经济学方法,并结合创业企业阶段融资的现实特点,构建了标准债务契约、简单可转债契约以及可赎回可转债契约三种实验环境,分析了上述三种金融契约对企业家和投资者激励效应的差异。实验结果表明,对于企业家而言,在可赎回可转债契约下投入的努力水平最高,在简单可转债契约下最低,标准债务契约下居中。对于投资者而言,在可赎回可转债契约下投入的初始资金比例最高,在简单可转债契约下最低,标准债务契约下居中。进一步地分析还发现,在控制了外部环境的影响时,可赎回可转债契约下,项目得到继续投资的概率最高,企业家和投资者双方的收益最高,社会福利最大。
It is an important issue in corporate finance research as to how to design reasonable financing contract between entrepreneurs and VC investors for entrepreneurial firms.Using experimental economics research methods,this paper examines whether different debt contracts have different incentive effects under staged financing context which is widely used financing strategy in entrepreneurial firms.The experimental results show that for entrepreneurs,they invest the highest level of effort when using callable convertible debt,the lowest level when using simple convertible debt,and the middle level when using standard debt;for VC investors,they provide the highest level of initial capital when using callable convertible debt,the lowest level when using simple convertible debt,and the middle level when using standard debt.Further analysis reveals that callable convertible debt is companied with the highest success probability of entrepreneurial enterprises,highest profits for entrepreneurs and VC investors,highest social welfare.
出处
《系统工程》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2011年第10期41-50,共10页
Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70972101)
关键词
阶段融资
标准债务契约
简单可转债契约
可赎回可转债契约
实验研究
Staged Financing
Standard Debt Contract
Simple Convertible Debt Contract
Callable Convertible Debt
Experimental Study
