摘要
论文在Besley和Coate的团体贷款经典模型基础上,从社会资本视角,将内部监督、社会惩罚及企业产出相互关系三个重要维度纳入综合分析模型,基于此综合模型讨论了可能影响团体贷款还款博弈的各因素的相互作用效果,较为系统地分析了中小企业团体贷款的还款问题,探讨了如何防止由于借贷双方信息不对称引起的策略性违约。
In this paper, based on Besley and Coate＇s classical model of group loan, we propose a comprehensive model which consists of internal monitor, social punishment and industry output from a unique perspective of social capital theory. In our study, we examine the factors and their interactive mechanisms which affect SEMs group finance, analyze their financing issues, and devise methods of preventing strategic default resulting from information imbalance of both sides.
出处
《亚太经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第6期39-43,共5页
Asia-Pacific Economic Review
基金
教育部博士点博导基金项目(2010019111003)的资助
