摘要
考虑了不对称信息下两级供应链中收益共享寄售系统的协调.首先,供应商向零售商谎报其生产成本;零售商根据供应商报告的生产成本,决定零售商的收益分配比例;最后,供应商决定零售价格和生产数量,并且保持产品的所有权.利用解析的方法得出一些理论结果:1)系统存在唯一的均衡解;2)系统效率只与需求价格弹性系数有关,随需求价格弹性系数递减,系统效率不低于73.6%;3)生产成本信息不对称使系统效率和系统灵活性下降;4)从长远来看,系统能够消除生产成本信息不对称带来的影响.
Coordination of consignment system with revenue-sharing is considered in a two-echelon supply chain under information asymmetry. The supplier misreports his manufacturing cost to the retailer; for each item sold, the retailer deducts a percentage from the selling price and remits the balance to the supplier according to the supplier＇s manufacturing cost reported. The supplier decides on the retail price and delivery quantity for his product, and retains ownership of the goods. Conclusions which can be drawn by analytical methods are： 1） there exits a unique analytic solution in equilibrium. 2）. only the demand price elasticity index will affect the （expected） efficiency of the system; the （expected） efficiency of the system will decrease with the demand price elasticity index; the （expected） efficiency of the system can not be lower than 73.6%. 3）. information asymmetry of manufacturing cost will lower the （expected） efficiency of the system and the flexibility of the system. 4）. the system can remove the effect of information asymmetry of manufacturing cost over a long period of time.
出处
《控制理论与应用》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2011年第10期1480-1484,共5页
Control Theory & Applications
基金
国家杰出青年科学基金资助项目(70625001)
国家创新研究群体科学基金资助项目(70721001)
关键词
谎报
寄售系统
收益共享
供应链管理
不对称信息
动态博弈
misreporting
consignment system
revenue sharing
supply chain management
asymmetric information
dynamic game
