摘要
罗素曾经认为每一个语句都对应一个被称作命题的超语言的复杂对象。这种观点使真假失去了本体论上的区别,因为真值为真的语句对应的真命题和真值为假的语句对应的假命题都是存在的。后来,他受摹状词理论的启发,提出只有真值为真的语句才有对应的复杂对象,这样的复杂对象被称为事实。他以此为线索,提出了真理的符合论定义:一个语句是真的,当且仅当该语句对应一个事实。通过较为详细地考察罗素的事实概念的来龙去脉,分析这个概念在罗素真理理论中所发挥的作用,在考察和分析的基础上可以指出:由于事实只不过是真命题的别名,所以建立在事实概念基础上的真理符合论的定义是一个空洞的定义。
Russell once took propositions as the extra - linguistic complex entities as the meaning of sentences.But he soon found that the opposition of truth and falsity could not be clarified on the ontological level,for true propositions and false propositions were equally existent under this view.Later on,enlightened by the theory of descriptions,he had brought forward earlier to cope with the antinomy of the nonexistent existents,he changed his mind and made the statement that only true sentences had corresponding extra - linguistic complexes called facts.He then gave his definition of truth in terms of facts:a sentence is true if and only if it corresponds to a fact.This paper examines in some detail Russell' s conception of facts in its contexts,especially in its connection with his theory of truth,and concludes that facts as Russell viewed ' are projected from true sentences for the sake of correspondence',and therefore this conception is vacuous and has no explanatory power for truth.
出处
《江海学刊》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第6期57-64,238,共8页
Jianghai Academic Journal
基金
江苏高校优势学科建设工程项目资助
