摘要
控股股东利用关联交易对中小投资者利益进行侵占已经成为公司治理研究中最重要的问题。本文采用中国A股民营上市公司的相关数据,从关联交易规模的角度实证检验了股权制衡因素和外部投资者法律保护对于控股股东侵占的影响。研究结果发现,股权制衡程度越高,控股股东的侵占水平会越低;但是法律保护和股权制衡之间存在替代关系,两者对于控股股东侵占的作用具有一定的重合性,如果同步提高的话,可能会削弱股权制衡对于控股股东侵占的限制作用。
Controlling shareholder＇s expropriation to minority shareholders by related-party transactions is a serious agency problem in corporate governance. This paper evaluate the effects of outside block holders and law protection using a firm-level dataset of China＇s private listed company in A-share stock market. We find that higher outside block holders ownership is associated with less expropriation. And there is a substitute relationship between the legal protection of the right of investors and outside block holders.
出处
《投资研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第8期101-110,共10页
Review of Investment Studies
关键词
控股股东
股权制衡
法律保护
关联交易
Controlling shareholders
Outside block holders
Legal protection
Related-party transaction
