摘要
从东道国与外商投资者的博弈行为出发,构建了一个用于分析外资优惠政策调整的动态博弈模型,据此模型得到三个命题:东道国引资过程满足边际收益等于边际成本条件,优惠政策的边界条件取决于收益系数、成本系数以及最佳外资规模的大小;优惠政策与投资环境具有反向的替代关系,与外资的最佳规模呈正比关系;低质量的投资对环境的敏感系数要小于高质量投资,低质量的投资对优惠政策的敏感系数要大于高质量投资。并用这三个命题对中国外资政策调整的历程做了解释。
Based on the conduction of the game between the host country and foreign investors, this paper constructs a dynamic game model to analyze the adjustment of preferential policies on the foreign investment. Then the paper gets three propositions from the model： the process in which the host country attract the foreign investment meet the condition that the marginal income is equal to the marginal cost, besides, the boundary conditions of preferential policies is decided by the income coefficient, the cost coefficient and the best foreign-scale size of the investment; The investment environment and preferential policies have the reverse alternation, and it has proportional relationship with the best-scale foreign investment; the low quality of the investment on the environment coefficient than the high-quality investment, besides, the preferential policies of the low-quality investment is more sensitive than that Of the high-quality investments. This paper also use these three propositions to explain the process of foreign policy adjustments in China.
出处
《生态经济》
北大核心
2011年第10期77-82,共6页
Ecological Economy
关键词
外资质量
投资环境
引资优惠政策
the quality of foreign investment
investment environment
the preferential policies for foreign investment
