摘要
这篇文章利用一个一般均衡模型研究"嚣张的特权"是如何运作的,是否可持续,以及去掉这个特权的后果。文章的主要结果包括:(1)发行储备货币的中心国家享受这种"嚣张的特权",他们能够利用外围国家的外汇储备来为他们的经常账户赤字融资。这种"嚣张的特权"以储备货币的高估为基础,而这种高估的一个可能的原因是中心国家的较高的货币增长率。(2)这种"嚣张的特权"在长期是不可能持续的。(3)如果"嚣张的特权"被剥夺,储备货币将贬值,外围国家的贸易条件将恶化,中心国家的贸易部门和外围国家的非贸易部门将扩张。中心国家选择发行货币还债时,其货币的贬值和外围国家贸易环境的恶化将更加显著,但是两国部门结构变化的幅度将减弱。
This paper develops a general equilibrium model to study how the ＂exorbitant advantage＂ works, whether it is sustainable, and what may be the consequences if it is removed. Its main findings are： （ 1 ） the center country that issuing the reserve currency enjoys the ＂exorbitant advantage＂ in the sense that her current account deficit can be financed by the periphery country＇s reserve holdings. The ＂exorbitant privilege＂ is predicated on the overvaluation of the reserve currency which may be caused by a higher rate of money growth in the center country; （2） the ＂exorbitant advantage＂ is not likely to be sustainable in the long run; （3） if the ＂exorbitant advantage＂ is removed, the value of the reserve currency will depreciate, the terms of trade will change against the periphery country and sector composition will change in favour of the tradable sector in the center country and in favour of the non-tradable sector in periphery country. If the center country repays her debt by printing money instead of raising taxes, the depreciation of the center country＇ s currency and the deterioration of the periphery country＇ s terms of trade will be more drastic but the changes in sector composition in both countries will be less pronounced.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第9期133-146,共14页
Economic Research Journal
关键词
“嚣张的特权”
国际货币
外部不均衡
外债
内部调整
＂Exorbitant Privilege＂
International Currency
External Imbalances
Foreign Debt
Internal Adjustment
