摘要
国内关于"龙头企业+农户"的研究更多地是从理论和定性方面展开的,本文利用博弈论的分析方法,定量分析交易成本、资产专用性、规模性等因素,在更为一般的条件下分别建立农业产业化龙头企业与农户之间实行合作过程中的完全信息静态博弈模型和无限阶段重复博弈模型,讨论了多种因素对局中人的影响,并在此基础上提出一些提高农业产业化龙头企业与农户建立长期合作的一些政策建议和制度安排。
It appears that domestic researchers on ＂Leading enterprises farmers＂ are more inclined to resort to theoretical or qualitative methodology rather than quantitative.Considering transaction costs,asset specificity and scale economies,this essay attempts to set up a static game model of perfect information and an infinite repeated game model respectively to explore cooperation between leading enterprises and farmers in more generalized terms,and furthermore investigates the factors that influence the insiders.Based on the above,some policy proposals and institutional arrangement are provided in order to improve cooperation between leading enterprises and farmers in a long run.
出处
《商业研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第9期180-186,共7页
Commercial Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目
项目编号:71063009
中国博士后基金资助项目资助
关键词
重复博弈
混合策略
精炼均衡
repeated game
hybrid strategy
perfect equilibrium.
