摘要
为了研究在政府产品创新补贴政策下企业的R&D策略选择问题,建立了双寡头市场中面向工艺R&D的三阶段博弈模型:第一阶段政府以社会福利最大为目标选择产品创新补贴率;第二阶段企业进行R&D投资以降低生产成本;第三阶段企业在产品市场中进行古诺竞争。根据双寡头在第二和第三阶段是否合作,给出了研发竞争、研发卡特尔、技术共享联盟和研究共同体等四种R&D策略,得到了相应的政府最优R&D补贴率。研究表明:从企业的R&D投入和产品产量的角度看,当溢出效应较高时,研发竞争策略优于研发卡特尔策略;当溢出效应较低时,研发卡特尔策略优于研发竞争策略。研发卡特尔策略与研发竞争策略相比,研发卡特尔更能推动企业利润的提高并且可以改善社会总福利。从产品产量、企业利润和社会总福利最大化角度考虑,研究共同体为四种策略中的最优策略。
A three-stage game model is established in a differentiated duopoly market with process R＆D （research and development） for researching firms＂ R＆D strategies under a government＇s product innovation subsidy policy. At stagel subsidy rate is invested by a government in order to maximize social total welfare, At stage2 R＆D expenditure is invested by the firms in order to reduce product cost, At stage3 the quantity is set in a condition of Cournot competition. According to whether the duopoly cooperates in R＆D and product stage, this paper gives the government＇s optimal R＆D subsidy rate and the firms＂ market performance under four different cases which are competition R＆D, cartel R＆D, technology sharing cartel and research joint venture respectively. It is showed that if spillovers are strong, then the cartel R＆D strategy is less efficient than the competition R＆D strategy and cartel R＆D strategy is more efficient than competition R＆D strategy if spillovers are weak through the perspectives of the firms＂ R＆D expenditure and output. Compared with competition R＆D strategy, cartel R＆D strategy should be chosen since it could promote the firms＂ profit, as well as social total welfare. In the four R＆D strategies which are compared in this paper, the RJV （Research Joint Venture） strategy is slightly superior to any other form from the view of maximum output, profit and social total welfare.
出处
《技术经济与管理研究》
北大核心
2011年第7期31-35,共5页
Journal of Technical Economics & Management
基金
江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学研究基金项目(09SJD630030)
关键词
古诺竞争
产品创新
创新补贴
企业研发
Cournot competition
Products innovative
Innovation subsidies
Enterprise development
