摘要
国家委托国家机关及其工作人员行使刑事追诉权,这一活动中国家和国家机关及其工作人员的关系与经济学意义上的"委托—代理模型"相契合。"委托—代理"必然产生信息不对称的问题,而信息不对称则会带来道德风险。刑事追诉中滥用权力表现为三种行为模式:对事实上无罪的人进行处罚、对事实上有罪的人加重处罚、对事实上有罪的人减轻处罚或者不处罚,这都会导致社会整体福利的减少,并损害国家利益。解决这一问题,一方面可以要求披露行使职权过程中的信息,另一方面可以建立职务侵权责任制度,让滥用权力的行为人承担不利后果。
A state entrusts authorities and their personnel enpowers it agends staff to prosecute crimes.The activity falls in the model of principal and agency in economics.In the model,there is a problem of asymmetric information,which leads to moral hazards in the form of abuse of powers.There are three types of misconduct in prosecution： punishing innocent people,aggravating punishment on wrongdoers,and alleviating punishment on wrongdoers or leaving them unpunished,which will harm the state＇s interest.To solve the problem,disclosure of information during prosecution may be required,and tort liability for misconduct may be established.Those who abuse powers will bear the adverse consequences and the state will know well the execution of powers in authorities and their personnel.
出处
《湘潭大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第4期81-83,共3页
Journal of Xiangtan University:Philosophy And Social Sciences
关键词
刑事追诉
信息不对称
滥用权力
职务侵权责任
prosecution
asymmetry of information
abuse of powers
tort liability of public authorities and officials
