我国上市公司资本投向分布与结构效率研究——追溯产权控制路径的实证考察被引量：4

Study On Capital Allocation and Structure Efficiency of Listed Company——Empirical Investigation through Property Ultimate Control Paths

下载PDF

导出

摘要本文将终极股东的现金流权比例和控制链层级统一到完整的终极控制路径之下,研究发现:终极控制路径中的现金流权比例越低或控制层级越多,终极股东越有动机增加固定资产、无形资产和股权并购上的自利性资本投入,并且削减R&D投资。终极控制路径对资本投向的影响因不同产权性质而存在差异。增加R&D投资整体上有利于缓解投资结构异化,提升资本投资的总体效率。 This paper uses the complete ultimate control paths to study the proportion of ultimate shareholders and the control chain level. Here are the conclusions ： as the proportion of cash flow right of the ultimate shareholders control path is getting lower or control hierarchy is getting more, they have more motivation to increase the self - interest investment on the fixed asset, the intangible asset and the equity merger, while cut the R＆D. Ultimate control path has different affection based on different property right. Adding R＆D improves the efficiency of capital investment.

作者郝颖李静明

机构地区重庆大学经济与工商管理学院

出处《经济与管理研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第8期73-81,共9页 Research on Economics and Management

基金国家自然科学基金"大股东自利动机与上市公司资本投向研究"(项目批号:70902030) 教育部人文社科项目"股权分置改革后的大股东自利动机与资本投资选择研究"(项目批号:09YJC630242) 重庆大学中央高校基本科研重大项目"终极产权控制路径与资本投资效率研究"(批准号:CDJSK 11 002)的阶段性成果

关键词终极股东控制路径资本投向结构效率 Ultimate Shareholders Control Path Capital Allocation Structure Efficiency

分类号 F276.6 [经济管理—企业管理]

引文网络
相关文献

参考文献16

1经济增长前沿课题组.高投资、宏观成本与经济增长的持续性[J].经济研究,2005,40(10):12-23. 被引量：147
2Shang -Jin Wei. Wasted Capital: Finn Ownership and Investment Efficiency in China[J/OL]. IMF Working Papers , 2007(9) : 21 -37. 被引量：1
3Shleifer A. ,R. W. Vishny. Management Entrenchment: The Case of Managerial Specific Investments [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1989 (25) : 123 -139. 被引量：1
4Dyck A. , L. Zingales. Private Benefits of Control : An International Comparison [ J ]. Journal of Finance, 2004 (59) :537-600. 被引量：1
5Kevin C, Zhihong Chen, K. C. Wei. Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow and the Effect of Shareholder Rights on the Implied Cost of Equity Capital[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2009(36) :54 -63. 被引量：1
6Almeida H. V. , Wolfenzon. A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and Family Business Groups [ J ]. Journal of Finance , 2006 (53) : 2637-2680. 被引量：1
7Rui A Albuquerque, Neng Wang. Agency Conflicts, Investment, and Asset Pricing[ J]. Journal of Finance, 2008 (37) : 1 -41. 被引量：1
8Tong Lu, Haresh. Auditor Conservatism and Investment Efficiency [ J ]. Accounting Review, 2009 (62) : 28-52. 被引量：1
9Demsetz,Harold,K. Eehn. The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1985(93) : 1155-1177. 被引量：1
10Fcng Gu,Weimin Wang. Intangible Assets, Information Complexity, and Analysts' Earnings Forecasts[J], Journal of Business Finance&Accounting, 2005 (32) :1673-1703. 被引量：1