摘要
在本体论或理气观上,朱熹哲学是柏拉图式的两个世界思想:但在心性论和道德修养领域,朱熹的"心学"思想却是系统、深思熟虑的,表现于各个方面。这就构成一种"矛盾"。而冯友兰、牟宗三否认有这种矛盾,一以贯之地以柏拉图式共相思想解释朱熹的心性和"格物致知"思想,认为"格物致知"是向外求理的认识论,把它用之于道德修养是思想糊塗、"不通";朱熹所讲的"性善"、"性即理"及"心之德",也被认为是告子和荀子一类思想。在这一解释模式之下,由程颐到朱熹、由北宋到南宋所发生的思想历史运动被抹杀了,朱熹对北宋诸子的思想"集大成"实际上变成了一句空话。冯友兰、牟宗三解释模式之成立,是混淆理论理性与实践理性之区别所导致,是切削掉朱熹哲学体系中与此模式相矛盾的最基本的材料或对之进行曲释所导致。然而,这对朱熹本人来说,实在是很大的不公正。
The ontology and the idea of li（理） and qi（气） of Zhu Xi＇s philosophy is a Platonic idea on two worlds. But in the fields of mind and ethics, Zhu Xi＇s ＂mind＂ is systematic and matured. They are formed into a ＂contradiction＂. This article tries to expound and answer that whether this contradiction is real and how it could be. Feng Youlan and Mo Zongsan denied such a contradiction, and they had been consistently explained Zhu Xi＇ s mind by Platonic idea of common phase. In this mode of interpretation, the movement of the history of ideas during the North and the South Song Dynasties is wiped out, thus denies that Zhu Xi＇s idea is the comprehensive result. Feng and Mo＇s mode of interpretation comes from a misunderstanding of theoretical reason from practical reason, and the basic material of Zhu Xi＇s is omitted or distorted. It is really ＂unfair＂ to Zhu Xi.
出处
《学术月刊》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第6期30-41,共12页
Academic Monthly
关键词
理论理性
实践理性
心性
明德
已知之理
道统
theoretical reason, practical reason, mind, ethic, known truth, Confucian orthodoxy
