摘要
战略联盟利益决策非常复杂,以往的决策多是简化成理性人的行为来采用博弈分析,Hart的契约参考点论述给了分析联盟利益决策以新的视角。将Hart的契约参考点论述引入战略联盟利益决策中,通过模型推导得出了重要结论:共同收益、机会收益、参考点和契约共同收益之间差值、联盟成员对该差值可接受的委曲程度共同作用于联盟的决策过程。
Decision-making on benefits of strategic alliances is very complex.In the past,a lot of papers uses game theory to analyse it based on personal rationality hypothesis.Hart＇s ＂contracts as reference points＂ provides a new view to analyze the decision-making processes of strategic alliances.This paper takes into consideration of Hart＇s ＂contracts as reference points＂ and obtains the results derived via an anlytical model： common benefits,opportunist benefits,difference between reference point and common benefits,the alliance members＇ aggrievement level—the four factors altogether influence the decision-making processes of strategic alliances.
出处
《系统管理学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第3期335-339,共5页
Journal of Systems & Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70972065)
教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-06-0412)
上海市科委软科学研究博士生学位论文资助项目(201006001)
关键词
战略联盟
不完全契约
参考点
Strategic alliances
incomplete contract
reference point
