摘要
股利政策在中国资本市场存在自身的特点,其中低股利是一个突出的特征。通过理论分析和实证数据检验了以下假设:在股权高度集中的条件下,现金流控制权和索取权分离导致大股东对上市公司进行掠夺,造成企业现金流不足,为此,企业通过融资来满足经营需要,同时边际融资成本递增造成掠夺成本逐步上升,因此,大股东选择低股利政策以"支持"上市公司,最终实现股权利益最大化。
The policy of dividend on shares in China＇s capital market has its own characteristics.The low dividend is a prominent feature.The paper tests the following assumption through theoretical analysis and empirical data：under the highly stake concentration,the separation of the control right and the claim right of cash flow leads the controlling shareholders to plunder the listed companies,causing the cash flow insufficient.So the enterprises have to meet their needs of cash flow by financing,while the fact that marginal financing cost increases by degrees makes the cost of tunneling increase also.For that,controlling shareholders choose the policy of low dividends to ＂sustain＂ the listed companies and actualize the maximum equity interests ultimately.
出处
《西北农林科技大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
2011年第3期35-40,共6页
Journal of Northwest A&F University(Social Science Edition)
关键词
现金流权分离
融资成本
股利支付倾向
the right of cash flow
separation
the cost of financing
the tendency of dividend distribution
