摘要
房产税改革的过程中,受到既得利益集团的阻碍,各相关利益主体之间对房产税改革产生的各种经济效应展开了复杂的博弈。不仅包括中央与地方政府之间、同级政府不同部门之间,也包括既得利益集团和弱势群体之间的矛盾等等。迟滞和掣肘房产税政策出台的既得利益集团,既有基于自身私利考虑的,也有从避免政策对社会经济形势的过大负面冲击的宏观大局出发的,不可一概而论,需要做深入分析。本文从博弈主体展开分析,首先从理论上分析各对利益主体的关系现状,其次利用数学和计量模型进行实证分析,最后提出对房产税改革相关政策建议。
Ever since the property tax first appeared in the Third Plenary Session of the Party＇s Sixteenth National Central Committee in 2003,it remains in experimental stage.It has expanded to nationwide since the simulated assessment of real-estate in Beijing and other six provinces.Looking through the long journey of property tax,the superficial reason is that the government is afraid of negative effects that adjusting the real estate market will have on economy.However,the deep reason is the barrier of vested interests.There exist fierce games between all stake-holder aiming at the economic effect of property tax.Not only the central government and local authorities have competed for profits,but also different departments in the same government have conflicts.What is more,the vested interests and the disadvantaged group have strong contradictions.Solving the problem has many reality factors and they cannot be quickly settled by bold and decisive reforms.The government has to avoid the big,negative shock brought by policy on social economy.This article tries to study the interest conflicts between four pairs of stakeholders.First,the author will clarify the present relationship between each pair.Next is the quantitative analysis with mathematical certification.Last,this paper will put forward several policy suggestion aiming at property tax.
出处
《中央财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第5期1-5,共5页
Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics
关键词
房产税
利益主体
博弈
Property tax Stake-holder Game
