摘要
文章依据铁矿石价格谈判的背景和原则,构建了供应链上游资源垄断者和下游两生产企业之间竞争及竞合的两个博弈定价模型。研究表明,供应链上游资源垄断者主要依据下游生产企业的利润水平确定其资源定价,影响下游议价能力的根本因素是其产量而非谈判技巧,竞合策略下价格谈判的先行者将获得更大的产量和利润优势。算例仿真结果则显示,与竞争策略相比,合作谈判策略能有效提高供应链下游生产企业的议价能力,降低上游垄断者的资源定价能力,有效缩减整体谈判成本。
Based on the background and principles of iron ore price negotiations, this paper constructs two game negotiation models, namely competition one, and coopetition one, between upstream resources monopolists and downstream producers. The results show that the upstream monopolists determine the resources prices according to the profit levels of the down- stream producers, and the bargaining power of the downstream firms de- pends on the production rather than negotiation skills~ and under coopetition strategy, the pioneers in price negotiations will gain greater yield and profit advantages. And the simulation results indicate that, compared to competition strategy, coopetition strategy in price negotiations could effectively improve the bargaining power of the downstream producers, reduce the resources pricing of the upstream monopolists and cut down the whole negotiations costs.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第5期101-111,共11页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70672079)
国家自然科学基金青年项目(70702032)
关键词
垄断性资源
定价
竞合博弈
序贯谈判
monopolistic resource
pricing
coopetitiongame
sequential negotiation
