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现金持有水平、投资者保护与关联交易 被引量:4

Cash Holdings,Investor Protection and Related Party Transactions
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摘要 以沪深两市的非金融类上市公司为样本,考察现金持有水平、投资者与关联交易之间的关系,结果发现上市公司的现金持有水平与关联交易显著正相关,这意味着上市公司的现金持有水平越高,基于大股东掏空的关联交易侵占越多;在投资者保护较差的公司,现金持有水平与关联交易之间的正相关关系更强,这说明有效的投资者保护体系能够起到约束大股东通过关联交易从上市公司转移现金的作用。因此进一步引导和规范上市公司的现金分红,以及加强投资者保护的执法力度,是治理关联交易的有效选择。 Based on the data of non -financial listed companies from both Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market, this paper explored the relationship between cash holdings, investor protection and related party transactions. We found that cash holdings was significantly and positively related to related party transactions, which meant the more cash the listed firms held the more related party transactions were aim at tunneling. The firms with poor investor' s protection showed higher relation between cash holdings and related party transactions. This indicates that the effective investor' s protection system can effectively con- straints large shareholders' tunneling behaviors of transferring cash from listed company through related party transactions. So, it is an effective choice to tunneling by further guiding and regulating the listed companies' strengthening the law enforcement. govern large shareholders' dividend policy as well as
出处 《广东金融学院学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第2期118-128,共11页 Journal of Guangdong University of Finance
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(70772079) 教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目(07JA630023)
关键词 现金持有 投资者保护 关联交易 cash holdings investor protection related party transactions
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