期刊文献+

基于鹰鸽博弈的作战单元自主协调机制研究 被引量:1

Research of the Self-coordination Mechanism Based on Hawk-dove Game
下载PDF
导出
摘要 针对自主协调过程中的合作与竞争的问题,运用鹰鸽博弈理论,对作战联盟中作战单元之间的自主协调机制进行了研究,旨在设计出一种能够最大化联盟整体效用的演化稳定策略(ESS)。通过分析鹰派与鸽派作战单元博弈的演化过程,得到了单纯的鹰策略和鸽策略都不是ESS的结论,在此基础上,提出了一种尊重物权的自由民策略,运用数学分析的方法,计算了联盟的整体效用,证明了自由民策略是演化稳定策略,并且能够使得作战联盟整体效用最大化。 Based on the Hawk-dove game theory,researching the self-coordination mechanism between the operational units.To design an evolutionary stable strategy which can maximize the union as a whole benefits.By analyzing the evolution of the hawks and the doves,getting the conclusion that the pure hawks and the pure doves are not ESS strategy.On this basis,proposed a freeman strategy which respecting for property rights.By the method of mathematical analysis,calculates the overall effectiveness of the alliance proofing freeman strategy is evolutionary stable strategy.And this strategy can make to maximize the overall effectiveness of combat union.
出处 《舰船电子工程》 2011年第3期26-29,共4页 Ship Electronic Engineering
关键词 自主协调 鹰鸽博弈 合作博弈 演化稳定策略 self-coordination Hawk-dove game cooperative game ESS
  • 相关文献

参考文献10

  • 1Nowak, Martin A. Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation[J]. SCIENCE, 1998(12) : 1560- 1563. 被引量:1
  • 2Nowak M A. , Sigmund K. Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring[J]. NATURE, 1998 (393): 573-577. 被引量:1
  • 3Hisashi ohtsuki, Yoh Iwasa. How should we define goodness-reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity[J]. Journal of Theoretical Biology,2004(23l) : 107-120. 被引量:1
  • 4Smith J Maynard, Price G R. The logic of animal conflict[J]. Nature, 1973(246) : 15-18. 被引量:1
  • 5Smith J Maynard. Evolution and the theory of games [M]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1982. 被引量:1
  • 6谢识予.有限理性条件下的进化博弈理论[J].上海财经大学学报,2001,3(5):3-9. 被引量:368
  • 7Mojdeh Mohtashemi, Lik Mui. Evolution of indirect reciprocity by social information: the role of trust and reputation in evolution of ahruism[J]. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2003(223) : 523-531. 被引量:1
  • 8Weibull J. Evolutionary Game Theory[M]. Cam bridge: MIT Rress, 1995. 被引量:1
  • 9[美]艾里克·拉斯缪森.博弈与信息:博弈论概论[M].王晖,白金辉,吴任吴,译.北京:北京大学出版社,2003,10. 被引量:2
  • 10SMITH M. The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflict[J]. Journal of Theory Biol, 1974(47) :209-212. 被引量:1

二级参考文献7

  • 1[1]Kreps,D. Game Theory and Economic Modeling[M]. Oxford University Press, 1990. 被引量:1
  • 2[2]J. W. Weibull. Evolutionary Game Theory[M]. MIT, 1995. 被引量:1
  • 3[3]K. Arrow, E. Colombatto. M. Perlman and C. Schmidt. The Rational Foundations of Economic Behaviour [M]. Macmillan Press LTD. 1996. 被引量:1
  • 4[4]Hammerstein, P. and R. Selten. ‘Game theory and evolutionary biology' Handbook of Game Theory[J]. vol.2, edited by Aumann, R. J. and S. Hart, Elsevier Science B. V. 929-993. 1994. 被引量:1
  • 5[5]Kandori, M. ‘ Evolutionary game theory in economics' Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Application[J]. Seventh World Congress Vol. 2, Edited by Kreps, D. and K. Wallis, Cambridge University Press. 243-277. 1997. 被引量:1
  • 6[6]Nash,J. ‘Non-cooperative games', Ph. D. thesis[M]. Mathematics Department, Princeton University, 1950. 被引量:1
  • 7[7]Roy Gardner. Games Business and Economics[M]. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. , 1995. 被引量:1

共引文献368

同被引文献19

引证文献1

二级引证文献6

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部