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美国、欧盟、韩国、日本微软案件比较研究——以软件产业中滥用支配地位的认定和规制为视角 被引量:6

A Comparative Study of U.S,EU,South Korean and Japanese Microsoft Cases——In the perspective of defining and regulating abuse of dominant position in software industry
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摘要 关于拒绝交易,欧盟、美国的司法救济没有本质差别。至于捆绑,美国要求微软隐藏被捆绑软件的图标;欧盟要求微软提供删除多媒体播放器源代码的视窗版本,但仍允许销售提供捆绑播放器的视窗版本;韩国除了采用类似于欧盟的救济以外,还要求微软在视窗操作系统中安装辅助软件,以方便用户下载微软竞争对手的软件;在针对微软IE浏览器与视窗的调查中,欧盟迫使微软承诺在视窗操作系统中设置选择屏,以便用户自由选择浏览器。比较而言,欧盟2004年的救济比美国的有力,韩国的救济比欧盟2004年的救济又更进一步,而欧盟2009年迫使微软在视窗中设置选择屏是迄今为止解决软件捆绑最彻底的救济手段。 With regard to refusal to deal, the remedies adopted by EU and US are materially the same as each other. As for bundling, US required Microsoft to hide the icons of bundled software; EU ordered Microsoft to provide Windows without WMP, while Windows bundling with WMP is still allowed; Besides the remedies similar to EU, South Korea also required Microsoft to install additional software in its Windows bundled witil WMP and MSN, so that the users could download the software from Microsoft 's competitors. Regarding Microsoft's bundling IE with its Windows, EU forced Microsoft to set up Choice Sereen to facilitate its users to choose web browser. Comparatively, the European remedy of 2004 is stronger than American one, while the remedy of South Korea is better than European one. So far, however, the European remedy of 2009 is the most thorough remedy to resolve the software bundling.
作者 罗先觉
出处 《河北法学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第12期176-185,共10页 Hebei Law Science
基金 国家社科基金课题<软件产业反垄断法实施研究>(09BFX048)的部分研究成果
关键词 微软 滥用支配地位 拒绝交易 捆绑 Microsoft abuse of dominant power refusal to deal bundling
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参考文献27

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