摘要
合资公司是介于市场交易和兼并之间的一种企业组织形式,它的存在会产生多种影响。一方面,合资公司中的协同效应有利于效率的提高,增进社会福利;另一方面,成立合资公司也会导致相关企业市场势力的上升,损害福利。通过一个零售合资企业模型,本文发现实际上这两个方面之间是彼此相关的。具体地,若没有协同效应,则不存在一个可行的利润分配原则和生产配额使得相关企业有意愿加入合资公司,进而无法达到增强市场势力的目的。基于这种关联性,本文给出了针对零售合资公司的反垄断政策建议:在高营利性行业中,当市场集中度较高时,应适用合理性原则;相反,当市场营利性较差或集中度较低时,需采用本身合法原则。
The joint venture is an intermediate form of organization between marketplace and mergers,and it will cause many implications.On one hand,the synergy effects stemming from the team work can enhance the efficiency and is helpful for the improvement of social welfare.On the other hand,the market position of the involved firms rises after the creation of the joint venture,which is bad to the welfare.In this paper,by a retail joint venture model we find that the influence of the above two aspects are related to each other.That is,without the synergy effects there does not exist a revenue sharing rule and a production quota arrangement under which the related firms will have the motivation to participate in the joint venture.Based on this kind of relationship,we provide the policy implications.Specifically,in the very profitable markets an evidence of considerable synergy effects must be provided to prove a specific joint venture.However,in the low-profitability market,the rule of per se legality should be adopted.
出处
《经济评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第2期5-11,54,共8页
Economic Review
基金
中国国家留学基金管理委员会资助
关键词
合资公司
协同效应
稳定性
福利
反垄断
Joint Venture
Synergy Effects
Stability
Welfare
Antitrust
